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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Amended Notice of Default materially altered the terms 
and the legal effect of the original Notice of Default and 
thereby vitiated the Notice of Default. The Amended Notice of 
Default gave the defendants and third parties actual and/or 
constructive notice that the defendants had three months from the 
date of the recording of the Amended Notice of Default to 
reinstate the loan and that the time frame for the foreclosure 
was commenced from the date of the recording of the Amended 
Notice of Default. Additionally, the Amended Notice of Default 
included a parcel of three, four-plexes which was omitted from 
the original Notice of Default although it was part of the 
property encumbered by the subject Trust Deed. This was a 
material change to the Notice of Default as plaintiff was not 
required to foreclose on all of its secured property. 
Accordingly, the court erred in finding that the Notice of 
Default and the December 1985 trustee's sale arising therefrom 
was a valid sale, as the Notice of Default had been vitiated. 
The Amended Notice of Default and subsequent April 1986 Trustee's 
Sale was the valid sale, and a judgment should be entered 
accordingly. 
ARGUMENT 
THE APRIL 1986 TRUSTEE'S SALE WAS THE VALID TRUSTEE'S SALE 
AS THE AMENDED NOTICE OF DEFAULT MATERIALLY ALTERED THE 
ORIGINAL NOTICE OF DEFAULT AND THEREBY VITIATED THE NOTICE 
OF DEFAULT AND INVALIDATED THE DECEMBER 1985 TRUSTEE'S SALE. 
The legal effect of the Amended Notice of Default cannot be 
1 
ignored by the defendants nor by the Court. The Amended Notice 
of Default must be considered as an alteration of the original 
Notice of Default. The general rule regarding alteration of 
documents is stated as follows: 
An alteration of an instrument, in order to have a 
vitiating effect, must be material; or, stated 
conversely, that an immaterial alteration of an 
instrument does not affect its validity.. . . Generally 
speaking, any alteration of an instrument is material 
which destroys the identity of the instrument...or 
which so changes its terms as to give it a different 
legal effect from that which it originally had, and 
thus works some change in the rights, obligations, 
interest or relations of the parties... . 
4 Am Jur 2d Alteration of Instruments § 4 and 5 (1962). 
The legal effect of the Amended Notice of Default on the 
original Notice of Default was twofold and, in fact, changed the 
rights and obligations of the parties. First, a new three month 
cure period began from the date of the filing for record the 
Amended Notice of Default, pursuant to the terms of Utah Code 
Ann. § 57-1-24 and 31 (1953 as amended) and the terms of the 
Amended Notice of Default itself which specifically provided for 
an extension of 90 days after the recording of the Amended Notice 
of Default for the defendants or other interested parties to 
reinstate the loan and cure the default. 
The second legal effect of the Amended Notice of Default was 
that its legal description included an additional parcel of 
property which consisted of three, four-plexes. This property 
was not included in the original Notice of Default, but was part 
of plaintiff's security under the subject Trust Deed. This 
property was divisible and separate from the property that 
2 
consisted of the original Notice of Default. The property was 
not required to be included in the foreclosure. For this reason, 
the Trustee amended the Notice of Default so as to properly 
include the three, four-plexes as part of the foreclosure. Had 
the Notice of Default not been amended, it is hardly conceivable 
that the defendants and the lower Court would have allowed the 
plaintiff to foreclose and sell the three, four-plexes. 
Furthermore, the recordation and mailing of the Amended 
Notice of Default not only provided actual notice to the 
defendants and other interested parties, but pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 57-3-2 (1988), provided constructive notice to "the 
world" that a new three month cure period and foreclosure 
proceeding had commenced. 
The lower Court, in a somewhat confusing manner regarding 
the Amended Notice of Default, stated that the "...amendment was 
a material defect in that notice which in a legal sense vitiated 
the effectiveness of the notice of default inasmuch as the 
defendants1 time to cure was not adversely affected in any way 
shape or form." (See Court Transcript, p. 9, lines 1-6). The 
lower Court stated that the Amended Notice of Default created a 
material change to the Notice of Default and thereby vitiated the 
Notice of Default. (See Court Transcript, p. 8, lines 21-25). 
Nevertheless, contrary to its findings, the lower Court held that 
the Notice of Default and thereby the December 1985 Trustee's 
Sale were valid. The lower Court also stated that the cure 
period was not shortened by the Amended Notice of Default. (See 
3 
Court Transcript, p. 8, lines 24-25). Ironically, however, by 
ignoring the Amended Notice of Default the lower Court in fact 
did shorten the cure period allowed to defendants and other 
parties by almost one and one-half months. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, neither the parties nor the Court 
may disregard the legal effect of the Amended Notice of Default 
which granted additional rights to the parties and materially 
altered and vitiated the original Notice of Default. 
Accordingly, the Court must find that the lower court erred 
in finding that the December 1985 Trustee's Sale was valid. The 
Amended Notice of Default with the subsequent April 1986 
Trustee's Sale, was the valid sale for the property and the Court 
should enter judgment accordingly. 
Respectfully submitted this 6th day of July, 1989. 
WOODBURY, BETTILYON, JENSEN, 
KESLER & SWINTON 
<r -4k^l/^^^^ 
Glen W. Roberts 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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57-1-24 KfcAL, 1LZ>1,\IL. 
COLLATERAL REFERKNCES 
C.J.S. — 59 C.J.S. Mortgages £ 555. sion in mortgage or deed of trust, 69 A.L.R.3d 
A.L.R. — Failure to keep up insurance as 774. 
jus!living foreclosure under ncceleraiion pmvi- Key N u m b e r s . — Mortgages *=» 341 
57-1-24. Sale of trust property by trustee — Notice of de-
fault. 
The power of sale herein conferred upon the trustee shall not be exercised 
until: 
(a) the trustee shall first file for record, in the office of the recorder of 
each county wherein the trust property or some part or parcel thereof is 
situated, a notice of default, identifying the trust deed by stating the 
name of the trustor named therein and giving the hook and pa^e where 
the same is recorded or a descnpt ion of t he i rust proper*;. . •.<; •. "nlamihL' 
a statement that a breach of an obligation for which th»- tru>i property 
was conveyed as security has occur) »••! and setting for'!; the nature of 
such breach and of his election to sell or cause to be sold such property t<> 
satisfy the obligation; 
(b> not less than three months shall hereafter elap.-r. :id 
to after the lapse of at least three months the trustee >ha 11 eive notice 
of sale as provided in this act. 
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, * 6; 1967. ch. 
131. * 1. 
NOTES TO DECISr N-
Three -month t ime per iod . ruptcy court, does not su?pend the runn.r.2 of 
Rule 601 of the Bankruptcy Act. which pro- the three-month time period required by this 
vide? that the filing of a bankruptcy petition section McCarthy v. Lewis. 615 P 2d 1256 
shall operate as a stay of any act to enforce a (Utah 1980). 
lien against property in custody of the bank-
COLLATEKAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 557 
Key N u m b e r s . — Mortgages &=> .'M*v 
57-1-25. Notice of trustee's sale — Description of property 
— Time and place of sale. 
(1) The trustee shall give written notice of the time and place of sale partic-
ularl^describing the property to be sold (a» by publication of such notice, at 
least three times, once a week for three consecutive weeks, the last publica-
tion to be at least 10 days but not more than 30 days prior to the sale, in some 
newspaper having a general circulation in each county in which the propt-ny 
tn be sold, or some part thereof, is situated, and <b> by posting surh noiuv. <:'. 
least 20 days before the date of sab1, in some conspicuous phuv on UR- pr^pt.-r.;.' 
to be sold and also in at least three public places of each city or county m 
which the property to be sold, or some part thereof, is situated 
40-1 
CONVEYANCES 57-1-31 
the sale took place. Upon depositing such balance, the trustee shall be dis-
charged from all further responsibility therefor and the county clerk shall 
deposit the same with the county treasurer subject to the order of th~ district 
court of said county. 
History: L. 1961. oh. 181. $ 11. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Dudes of trustee. in orck-r to assist certain interest 1. : - r - at the 
A trustee under trust deed has an affirm a- expend <>( others. Kandail v Vail-- T.'le. (SHI 
tive duty to uphold his statutory responsihili- \\2d 21 H (Utah 19M 
ties, and may not ignore those responsibilities 
COI.I.ATEKAl. RHFKKKNVKS 
C.J.S. fv.i i .] > Mmts ja^- s ."»'.'«; 
Key N u m b e r s . M'lrt^a^cs : - a7»'« 
57-1-30. Sale of trust property by trustee — Corporate 
stock evidencing water rights given to secure 
trust deed. 
Shares of corporate stock evidencing water right.- used, intended ". ' r used, 
or suitable for use on the trust property and which are hypothecated : -ecure 
an obligation .secured by a trust deed may he sold with the trust p.- i r r ty , or 
ai";\ oart thereof, at the trustee's sale in the manner provided lr. :r.> act. 
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 12. ently refers to L. 1%: . ch 1*1 <A;...- enacted 
Meaning of "this act'\ -— The phrase *"thi> this section and >^ "- ' - 'J1* to r " • 1 -29 and 
act" appearing at the end of this section appar- ">7-l-31 to 57-1 -.'US. 
57-1-31. Trust deeds — Default in performance of obliga-
tions secured — Reinstatement— Cancellation of 
recorded notice of default. 
'< 1 > Whenever all or a portion of the principal sum of any </h!igat. ~. --.-cured 
by a trust deed has, prior to the maturity date fixed in such obligati ~ r^come 
due or been declared due by reason of a breach or default in the per:":r:nance 
of any obligation secured by the trust deed, including a default in thr z v.rnent 
of interest or of any installment of principal, or by reason of la:. .;-T of the 
trustor to pay, in accordance with the terms of the trust u*-ed. tax- - >.ssess-
ments, premiums for insurance, or advances made by the heneficiar;. .r. accor-
dance with terms of such obligation or of such trust deed, the t r i> : : ; <>r his 
successor in interest in the trust property or any part ih^reuf or - r. • other 
person having a subordinate lien or encumbrance of r e c r d thet - - .r any 
beneficiary under a subordinate trust deed, at any time within ih.--- •\<>nth-
of the filing for record of notice of default under such trust «ir»'d. if i: - »ver ut 
sale is to be exercised, may pay to the beneficiary or hi- -uccessor .:. :.teres* 
the entire amount then due under the terms of such tru>t deec .r..aiding 
costs and expenses actually incurred in enforcing the terms of such - ..nation. 
4 0 9 
or trust deed, and the trustee's and attorney's fees actually incurred1 other 
than such portion of the principal as would not then be due had no default 
occurred, and thereby cure the default theretofore existing and, thereupon, all 
proceedings theretofore had or instituted shall be dismissed or discontinued 
and the obligation and trust deed shall be reinstated and shall be and remain 
in force and effect the same as if no such acceleration had occurred. 
(2) If the default is cured and the trust uued reinstated in the manner 
provided in Subsection (1), the beneficiary, or his assignee, shall, on demand 
of any person having an interest in the trust property, execute and deliver to 
him a request to the trustee to execute, acknowledge, and deliver a cancella-
tion of the recorded notice of default under such trust deed; and any benefi-
ciary under a trust deed, or his assignee, who, for a period of 30 days after 
such demand, refuses to request the trustee to execute and deliver such can-
cellation is liable to the person entitled to such request for all damages it suit-
ing from such refusal. A release and reconveyance given by the trustee or 
beneficiary, or both, or the execution of a trustue's deed constitutes a cancella-
tion of a notice of default Otherwise, a cancellation of a recordod not;.- .»(' 
default under a trust deed is. when acknowledged, entitled to be recorded mil 
is sufficient if made and •executed by the trustee in subMantiallv the folb»v. :ng 
form: 
Can. illation of Notice of Default 
The undersigned hereby cancels the notice of default filed for record 
, 19 , and record in Book , Page , Record- of 
County, (or filed of record 19 , with recorder's entry 
No. , County). Utah, which notice of default refer- to the 
trust deed executed bv as trustor, in which is named as 
beneficiary and _ as trustee, and filed for record . 19 
and recorded in Book Page , Records of 
County, (or filed of record 19 , with recorder's entry No. 
, County), Utah. 
(legal description* 
Signature of Trustee 
Historv: L. 1961, ch. 181, « 13; 1967, ch. 
131, § 2; 1981, ch. 100, § 4; 1985, ch. 68, § 3. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1981 amend-
ment deleted "not exceeding in the aggregate 
fifty dollars or one-half of one percent of the 
entire unpaid principal sum secured, which-
ever is greater" after "fees actually incurred" 
at the end of the parenthetical phrase in the 
first sentence; inserted the third sentence; in-
serted "Otherwise" at the beginning of the 
fourth sentence; inserted "(legal description*" 
in the form; and made minor changes in phra-
seology, punctuation and style. 
T!it* 1985 amendment de>U:nat*-d T:>.- :-ir-
merlv undesignated paragraphs a> Suo--.-::; n> 
(1> and i2), deleted "or. otherwise at an;, time 
prior to the entry of the decree of foreclosure" 
and 'and the obligation secured thcr>-h. :>ar 
the middle of Sub>ection i 1 .\ suh-uvr . ' - i "in 
the manner provided m Suh-'-i-tion 1 :" r in 
the manner hereinabove provided n»-ar ':> be-
ginning and deleted "be" near th«- t-nd ,:" "u\>-
section <2i. and made minor tiiiiii^t-. n. ;,.-..• .•.->•• • 
olop\ and punctuation 
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57-3-1 REAL ESTATE 
CHAPTER 3 
RECORDING OF DOCUMENTS 
Section Section 
57-3-1. Certificate of acknowledgment or of 57-3-3. Effect of failure to record. 
proof of execution a prerequisite. 57-3-4. Certified copies entitled to record 
57-3-2. Record imparts notice — Recorda- another county — Effect. 
tion not affected by change in in- 57-3-10. Legal description of real proper 
terest rate — Validity of document and names and addresses requir 
not affected — Third person not in documents. 
charged with notice of unnamed 57-3-11. Original documents required — Ca 
interests — Conveyance free and tions — Legibility. 
clear of unrecorded interests. 
57-3-L Certificate of acknowledgment or of proof of exi 
cution a prerequisite. 
A certificate of the acknowledgment of any document, or of the proof of tl 
execution of any document that is signed and certified by the officer takir 
the acknowledgment as provided in this title, entitles the document and tl 
certificate to be recorded in the office of the recorder of the county where tl 
real property is located. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1999; ment, effective July 1, 1988, substituted "doc 
C.L. 1917, § 4899; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, ment" for "conveyance" throughout the secti 
78-3-1; 1988, ch. 155, § 13. and made stylistic changes. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend-
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Law Reviews. — Recent Developments in 
Utah Law, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 95, 123. 
57-3-2, Record imparts notice — Recordation not affecte 
by change in interest rate — Validity of doci 
ment not affected — Third person not charge 
with notice of unnamed interests — Conveyanc 
free and clear of unrecorded interests. 
(1) Each document executed, acknowledged, and certified, in the manm 
prescribed by this title; each original document or certified copy of a documei 
complying with Section 57-4a-3, whether or not acknowledged; and each i 
nancing statement complying with Section 70A-9-402, whether or not a 
knowledged; shall, from the time of filing with the appropriate county r 
corder, impart notice to all persons of their contents. 
(2) If a recorded document was given as security, a change in the intere 
rate in accordance with the terms of an agreement pertaining to the underl; 
ing secured obligation does not affect the notice or alter the priority of t\ 
document provided under Subsection (1). 
(3) This section does not affect the validity of a document with respect 1 
the parties to the document and all other persons who have notice of th 
document. 
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names the grantee as trustee, or otherwise purports to be in trust without 
naming beneficiaries or stating the terms of the trust does not charge any 
third person with notice of any interest of the grantor or of the interest of any 
other person not named in the document. 
(5) The grantee in a recorded document may convey the interest granted to 
him free and clear of all claims not disclosed in the document in which he 
appears as grantee or in any other document recorded in accordance with this 
title that sets forth the names of the beneficiaries, specifies the interest 
claimed, and describes the real property subject to the interest. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2000; ment, effective July 1, 1988, added Subsections 
C.L. 1917, $ 4900; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, (3) to (5- and rewrote Subsections (1) and (2), as 
78-3-2; L. 1977, ch. 272, § 54; 1985, ch. 159, last amended by Laws 1985, ch 159. § 7, to 
§ 7; 1988, ch. 155, § 14. such an extent that a detailed comparison is 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- impracticable. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Effect of failure to record 
Mortgages. 
Recordation as notice. 
—Time from which notice imparted. 
Effect of failure to record. this section Utah Farm Prod. Credit Assoc, v 
Where a prior deed was not recorded until Wasatch Bank, 734 P 2d 904 (Utah 1987*. 
three years after the purchasers' assignments Recordation as notice, 
of their equitable interests in the property _ _ T i m e f r o m w h j c h n o d c e i m d> 
were executed and recorded, the assignee had
 T h e d . ,;f r e c o r d n o l l h e d a t e o f e x e c u . 
no constructive notice of the deed, and the as-
 t i o n g0V|;..MS t h e U m e f r o m w h l c h a n i n s t r u . 
Bignee's hen was therefore superior to a bank's
 m e n t i m p a r l s n o t ) c e l 0 a li persons Uiah Farm 
subsequent trust deed received from the pur- p r o d C r e d l t A s s n v Wasatch Bank. 734 P.2c 
chasers. Utah Farm Prod. Credit' Assoc, v. 994 (Utah 1986) 
Wasatch Bank, 734 P.2d 904 (Utah 19871. 
Mortgages. 
Mortgages are subject to the provisions of 
57-3-3. Effect of failure to record. 
Each document not recorded as provided in this title is void as against an;-
subsequent purchaser of the same real property, or any portion of it, if: 
(1) the subsequent purchaser purchased the property in good faith anc 
for a valuable consideration; and 
(2) the subsequent purchaser's conveyance is first duly recorded 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2001; ment" for "conveyance -,t" real esu'V in t.> 
C.L. 1917, §4901; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943. introductory paragraph added Sub,- uun> . 
78-3-3; 1988, ch. 155, § 15. and <2\ deleting comparable pnn.-.,n.- \r-~ 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- the lntroductorv paragraph, and rr.cje mir.. * 
ment, effective July 1, 1988. substituted "docu- stylistic changes 
73 
II . EFFECT OF ALTERATION; FACTORS CONSIDERED 
A. I N GENERAL 
§ 3. Generally; kinds of instruments. 
The general rules as to the effect of Unauthorized alterations in written 
instruments were originally applied only to deeds, and appear to have been 
founded on the solemn character of sealed instruments as evidence. The 
doctrine was later extended to bills of exchange, and was finally held to apply 
indiscriminately to all written instruments conveying title to property or 
evidencing legal rights or obligations.18 
§ 4. Materiality of alteration, generally. 
It is now14 the settled general rule that an alteration of an instrument, 
in order to have a vitiating effect, must be material;16 or, stated conversely, 
that an immaterial alteration of an instrument does not affect its validity.16 
This general rule is recognized under both the Uniform Negotiable Instru-
ments Act and the Uniform Commercial Code.17 
§ 5 . — What constitutes material alteration.18 
Generally speaking, any alteration of an instrument is material which de-
stroys the identity of the instrument or of the contract evidenced thereby, or 
which so changes its terms as to give it a different legal effect from that which 
13. Vanauken v Hornbcck, 14 NJL 182; 
Newell v Mayberry, 30 Va (3 Leigh) 250. 
The same rule as to alteration applies to 
negotiable promissory notes as to other instru-
ments. Wilson v Hayes, 40 Minn 531, 42 
NW 467. 
As to alteration of wills, see W I L L S (1st ed 
;i§ 508 et seq,). 
14. According to the early English doctrine, 
any alteration of an instrument, however im-
material, if made by the payee or obligee 
of such instrument, would avoid it. Lewis 
v Payn, 8 Cow (NY) 71 ; Wricker v Jones, 
159 NC 102, 74 SE 801. In some jurisdictions 
in the United States in early cases it was 
sought to hold rigidly to this doctrine. But 
these cases either have been expressly or im-
pliedly overruled, or have not been followed, 
or have been superseded by statute. (As to 
the present law, see the discussion following 
in this and the next succeeding sections.) 
15. Fordyce v Kosminski, 49 Ark 40, 3 SW 
892: Harris v Jacksonville Bank, 22 Fla 501, 
1 So 140; Vogle v Ripper, 34 111 100; Cypress 
Creek Coal Co. v Boonville Min. Co. 194 Ind 
187, 142 NE 645; Gushing v Field, 70 Me 
50; Mitchell v Ringgold. 3 Harr & J (Md) 
159: White Sewing Mach. Co. v Dakin, 86 
Mich 581, 49 NW 583: Herrick v Baldwin, 
17 Minn 209; Bridges v Winters. 42 Miss 
135; Bank of Moberly v Meals, 316 Mo 1158, 
295 SW 73; Gleason v Hamilton, 138 NY 
353, 34 NE 283; Wicker v Jones, 159 NC 
102. 74 SE 801; Newman v King, 54 Ohio 
St 273, 43 NE 683: Manufacturers' & M. 
Bank v Follett, 11 RI 92; Sawyer v National 
F. Ins. Co. 53 SD 228, 220 NW 503, 61 
ALR 306; Bank of Tennessee v Funding 
Board, 84 Tcnn (16 Lea) 46; Reed v Roark, 
14 Tex 329; McClure v Little, 15 Utah 379, 
49 P 298; Newell v Mayberry, 30 V a ( 3 
Leigh) 250; James Employees Credit Union 
v Hawley, 2 Wis 2d 490, 87 NW2d 299. 
The early English doctrine was modified, 
even in the time of Lord Coke, to the ex-
tent that the alteration must be material, and 
that the question as to the time when made 
should be submitted to a jury. In 2 Co Litt 
225b, it is said that "of ancient time, if the 
deed appeared to be rased or interlined in 
places material, the judges adjudged upon 
their view the deed to be void; but of latter 
time the judges have left that to the jurors 
to try whether the rasing or interlining were 
before the delivery." Wicker v Jones, 159 
NC 102,74 SE 801. 
Practice Aids.—Instructions to jury as to 
materiality of alteration and as to effect of 
material alteration. 1 AM J U R P L & PR 
FORMS 1:1008-1:1010. 
16. Van Horn v Bell, 11 Iowa 465: Bridges 
v Winters, 42 Miss 135; Reed v Roark, 14 
Tex 329. 
If a negotiable instrument is altered in some 
immaterial particular, the liability of the par-
ties on the instrument is not affected. Palmer 
v Largent, 5 Neb 223. 
17. Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act 
§§ 124, 125; Uniform Commercial C de § 3 -
407. 
18. As to negotiable instruments generally, 
see § 6, infra. 
6 
I -v *> tuc u i t t i ui me iici upon me instrument, 
and not the particular manner in which it is done, that is material, whether 
by interlineation, addition, substitution, change of words, detaching material 
memoranda therefrom, erasure, or by cancellation of some material provision 
thereof.*0 That is material which might become material, and any alteration 
which may in any event alter the rights, duties, or obligations of the person 
sought to be charged, is material in the legal sense.1 An alteration which en-
larges the scope of an instrument as evidence is material.1 An unauthorized 
change of or addition to an instrument which has the effect of extending 
the period of limitation of actions is a material alteration.3 On the other hand, 
•an alteration of an instrument may be considered immaterial if it does not 
vary the menning of such instrument in any essential particular,4 and if the 
rights or interests, duties or obligations of either of the parties arc in no manner 
changed,5 or if what is written or erased has no tendency to produce a change 
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"A material alteration is one which makes 
the instrument speak a language different 
in legal effect from that which it originally 
spoke; an alteration which produces some 
change in the rights, interests, or obligations 
of the parties to the instrument." Barton 
Saw Bank & T. Co. v Stephenson, 87 Vt 
433, 89 A 639. 
A "material alteration" of a written instru-
ment is an intentional act done upon it 
after it has been fully executed, by one of 
the parties thereto, without the consent of 
the other, which changes the legal effect of 
the instrument in any respect. O. N. Bull 
Remedy Co. v Clark, 109 Minn 396, 124 
NW 20. 
Any tampering with a written instrument 
which imposes upon a party a burden or 
peril which he would not otherwise have 
incurred is an injury to him and therefore 
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For particular acts as constituting altera-
tion, sec §§ 36 et seq., infra. 
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